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Note
THE ROLE OF PARENTS INVOLVED IN THE
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROCESS
MICHAEL P. POHORYLO
After the U.S. Supreme Court decided the 2003 University of Michigan
affirmative action cases, the law concerning the use of race-based
affirmative action programs in the college admissions process seemed to
be settled for the next few decades. However, in 2007, the Supreme Court
once again revisited the use of race-based affirmative action, this time at
the K–12 level, and subtly, yet significantly, altered how the law will treat
challenges to affirmative action programs in higher education. The
purpose of this Note is to examine the likely impact the holding of this 2007
U.S. Supreme Court case, Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1, will have on both the current case law
surrounding the use of race-based affirmative action policies in the college
admissions process and the development and implementation of future
institutional affirmative action policies. In addition, this Note explores the
public policy effect resulting from restrictions on the freedom of
institutions to create their own admissions policies.
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THE ROLE OF PARENTS INVOLVED IN THE
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROCESS
MICHAEL P. POHORYLO*
I. INTRODUCTION
After the United States Supreme Court decided the 2003 University of
Michigan affirmative action cases,1 college administrators rejoiced in what
many saw as a victory over the opponents of race-based affirmative action
policies in the college admissions process.2 While these decisions did not
go so far as to ensure that the use of race-based affirmative action policies
would be a valid practice forever,3 administrators knew that for the
foreseeable future they could consider the race of an applicant during the
admissions process. Specifically, in affirming the precedent set in Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke,4 the Supreme Court held that
achieving a diverse student body within the realm of higher education was
a compelling government interest, and, as a result, race-based affirmative
action policies could withstand strict scrutiny if they were narrowly
tailored.5 Although these policies had to be narrowly tailored to survive
judicial review, colleges and universities were still provided with sufficient
autonomy to adopt admissions standards that were consistent with their
educational mission and the needs of their communities.
By 2006, however, this period of celebration had already come to an
abrupt end when the U.S. Supreme Court decided that it would address the
issue of whether race could be used as a factor in assigning K–12 students

*
Amherst College, B.A. 2004; Boston College, M.A. 2007; University of Connecticut School of
Law, J.D. Candidate 2010. I would like to thank Dean and Professor Darcy Kirk for her suggestions
and comments throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank my parents, Michael and
Diane Pohorylo, for their years of guidance, without which this Note would not be possible. Finally,
this Note is dedicated to my wife, Morgan, for her endless encouragement and support. All errors
contained herein are mine and mine alone.
1
These cases were published as Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
2
See, e.g., Narrow Use of Affirmative Action Preserved in College Admissions, CNN, Dec. 25,
2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/06/23/scotus.affirmative.action (“[T]his is a wonderful,
wonderful day—a victory for all of higher education, because what it means at its core is that
affirmative action may still be used and the court’s given us a road map to get there . . . .” (quoting
University of Michigan President Mary Sue Coleman)).
3
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (“We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences
will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”).
4
See 438 U.S. 265, 311–12, 315–17 (1978) (holding that achieving a diverse student body was a
constitutionally permissible goal for colleges and universities but that race could not be the deciding
factor in determining whether an applicant was admitted).
5
See infra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.
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6

to public schools. Although the Court would be addressing this issue
within the K–12 education system alone, many experts debated whether
the University of Michigan affirmative action cases would still be good
law after a decision was rendered.7 While some experts in higher
education law believed that the holding would have no effect on the
Michigan rulings, others believed that the Court would suggest that it was
“open” to revisiting the 2003 holdings and possibly revising the precedent
set at that time.8 Many of the fears among the supporters of race-based
affirmative action were later alleviated when the Court decided Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 19 and left
the 2003 affirmative action cases seemingly intact. In reaching the holding
of Parents Involved, the majority relied heavily on the Court’s earlier
views on affirmative action as described in Grutter v. Bollinger,10 and
found that the use of race as a factor in the college admissions process was
still permitted.11
But, the Court’s decision was not so simple. While Parents Involved
did not overturn the Michigan cases, it did not leave the higher education
community with the same freedom to administer affirmative action policies
as the 2003 cases did. Specifically, Parents Involved subtly set new
requirements on the use of affirmative action within the college admissions
6
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 547 U.S. 1177 (2006); Meredith
v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 547 U.S. 1178 (2006); see also Jeffrey Selingo, Supreme Court Will
Hear Affirmative-Action Cases with Potentially Broad Meaning for Higher Education, C HRON .
HIGHER E DUC. (Wash., D.C.), June 16, 2006, at A26 (claiming that the effect of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision to decide the legality of using race as a factor in assigning students to public schools
on the University of Michigan affirmative action cases was “unclear” and “the subject of much
debate”).
7
After the Court granted certiorari to decide the constitutionality of assigning K–12 students to
schools based on race, higher-education lawyers created three scenarios that could result for colleges
from the forthcoming decisions:
Scenario 1. The decisions would contain language that provided colleges with
guidance on how to apply the Michigan rulings. The court did not endorse a single
admissions method in its mixed decisions in 2003. In one case, the court upheld the
race-conscious admissions policies used by Michigan’s law school because the
school considered each applicant individually. In the other case, the justices struck
down the admissions policy at Michigan’s main undergraduate college because it
awarded each black, Hispanic, and American Indian applicant a 20-point bonus on a
150-point scale.
Scenario 2. The rulings would suggest that the court was open to revisiting the
Michigan decisions through another case involving race-conscious admissions at
colleges.
Scenario 3. The decisions would be narrowly tailored and would apply only to
public school districts.
Selingo, supra note 6.
8
Id.
9
127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). At the time of publication, this case had not been published in the U.S.
Reporter. For that reason, all citations to Parents Involved reference the Supreme Court Reporter.
10
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
11
Peter Schmidt, High Court Leaves Michigan Cases Intact, C HRON . HIGHER E DUC. (Wash.,
D.C.), July 6, 2007, at A1.
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process and, perhaps, began a trend towards restricting the holdings of the
University of Michigan cases. The purpose of this Note is to examine
these new requirements by focusing on the impact the holding of Parents
Involved will have on the past affirmative action cases, as well as the future
use of affirmative action within the college admissions process. This Note
also argues that the judicial branch should refrain from any further
restriction on affirmative action policies due to the beneficial effect diverse
student bodies have on the learning experiences and personal development
of all college students, as well as societal growth in general.
Part II of this Note examines the history of affirmative action programs
in the United States and maps its current impact on college enrollment. It
specifically looks at the development of affirmative action programs as
they moved from the realm of employment law into the college admissions
process. It also examines how the federal government served as a catalyst
for institutions to create their own internal affirmative action policies. Part
III summarizes the leading federal affirmative action cases of the U.S.
Supreme Court and the circuit courts and looks at one important case at the
state level. Although this list is by no means exhaustive of the case law in
this area, it looks specifically at those cases which have had the greatest
impact on this area of the law. In Part IV, this Note analyzes the Supreme
Court’s decision in Parents Involved and the impact it will have on the use
of affirmative action policies in college admissions programs. Finally, Part
V argues that the Supreme Court should not look to alter the holdings of
the University of Michigan affirmative action cases in future decisions
until the “playing field” for college admissions is level for students of all
backgrounds.12 This final section of the Note shows that researchers have
found that while minority students immediately benefit from affirmative
action programs by receiving an “edge” in the application process, all
students, and even all of society, will eventually benefit from the existence
of racially diverse colleges and universities. Additionally, this Note argues
that the level of diversity required to achieve these benefits cannot be
achieved through alternative admissions policies. As a result, this Note
concludes by arguing that race-based affirmative action policies are
currently needed to ensure that colleges maintain diverse and,
consequently, beneficial learning environments.
12

Another threat to affirmative action, which this Note does not address but affirmative action
advocates should be aware of, can come from ballot initiatives. Voters in Washington, Michigan, and
Nebraska have all passed bans on race-based affirmative action policies with about fifty-eight percent
of the vote, while California voters approved a ban with fifty-four percent of the vote. Colorado voters
very narrowly rejected a ballot measure banning preferences based on race in the 2008 elections by one
percentage point to become the first state to vote against such a ban. However, it is argued that the
ballot was defeated only because of the popularity of Barack Obama at the time of the election. Reeves
Wiedeman, Analysis: How Colorado Became the First State to Reject a Ban on Affirmative Action,
C HRON . H IGHER E DUC. (Wash., D.C.), Nov. 10, 2008, http://chronicle.com/article/Analysis-WhyColorado-Fail/1317.
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II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
For the purpose of this Note, it will be beneficial to understand
affirmative action as “a policy of favoring qualified women and minority
candidates over qualified men or nonminority candidates with the
immediate goals of outreach, remedying discrimination, or achieving
diversity, and the ultimate goals of attaining a color-blind (racially just)
and a gender-free (sexually just) society.”13 While it is important to
understand the role affirmative action plays in attaining gender equality,
this Note focuses primarily on the goals of attaining what the above
definition refers to as a racially just society.
Although the use of race-based affirmative action has been the subject
of much debate recently and has been litigated over numerous times in
state and federal courts, the actual practice and recognition of affirmative
action is fairly new to the United States. President John F. Kennedy
adopted the term “affirmative action” in 1961, marking the first time it was
publicly used in American society.14 When President Kennedy created the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, he required that projects
receiving federal funds take “affirmative action to ensure that applicants
are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without
regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.”15 The affirmative
action which was called on by President Kennedy to ensure equal
treatment of employees was intended to apply to the areas of “employment,
upgrading, demotion or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising;
layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and
selection for training, including apprenticeship.”16 The term “affirmative
action” was later repeated by President Lyndon Johnson in 1965 when he
revisited Kennedy’s Executive Order No. 10,925.17
Other legislation during the mid-1900s which adopted the term

13
James P. Sterba, Completing Thomas Sowell’s Study of Affirmative Action and Then Drawing
Different Conclusions, 57 STAN . L. R EV. 657, 659 (2004) (book review). Sterba goes on to further
categorize affirmative action programs. He claims that “all forms of affirmative action can be
understood, in terms of their immediate goals, as being either outreach, remedial, or diversity
affirmative action,” and “remedial affirmative action further divides into two subtypes, with one
subtype simply seeking to end present discrimination and create an equal playing field, and the other
subtype attempting to compensate for past discrimination and its effects.” Id. at 661.
14
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master’s “Tool” to Dismantle His House: Why Justice
Clarence Thomas Makes the Case for Affirmative Action, 47 ARIZ. L. R EV. 113, 124–25 (2005).
15
Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 44, 1977 (Mar. 8, 1961) (emphasis added).
16
Id.
17
See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 187, 12,319 (Sept. 28, 1965). Using the same
wording as Kennedy’s Executive Order No. 10,925, Johnson mandated that “[t]he contractor will not
discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or
national origin. The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and
that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national
origin.” Id. (emphasis added).
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“affirmative action” included Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,18
also a product of the Johnson administration. Concerning employers that
had intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice, section
706(g) of the Act provided courts with the authority to
enjoin the [employer] from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include reinstatement or
hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by
the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as
the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment
practice).19
Similar to the other non-discrimination statutes of this era, this section of
the Civil Rights Act was designed specifically to remedy intentional acts of
discrimination.
Five years later, President Richard Nixon adopted the “Philadelphia
Plan” which went one step further in the government’s quest to increase
minority presence in the American workforce. Rather than providing a
remedy to minority workers for discriminatory practices by their
employers, the “Philadelphia Plan” called for preemptive measures to
prevent discriminatory behavior. The plan required specific percentage
targets of minority employees in construction-related trades to be set forth
in Philadelphia and incorporated in bids for all government contracts
issued in that area.20 President Nixon’s 1969 plan was a “revised” version
of the original “Philadelphia Plan” created by the U.S. Department of
Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”).21
The original plan, which was created in 1967, was declared illegal because
it did not contain “‘definite minimum standards on which approval or
disapproval of an affirmative action program would be based.’”22 The
revised plan by the Nixon administration avoided this shortcoming by
implementing the above mentioned targets.23 While the “Philadelphia
Plan,” along with the Civil Rights Act and the executive orders of
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, were major steps toward eliminating
overt discrimination in American society, in order to address discrete and
unintentional forms of discrimination, affirmative action policies were
18

Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006)).
Id. at 261 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5) (emphasis added). Congress later added “or any
other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate” as part of a court’s authority to order affirmative
action measures. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
20
Mitchell J. Chang et al., Race in Higher Education: Making Meaning of an Elusive Moving
Target, in AMERICAN H IGHER E DUCATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST C ENTURY 517, 529 (Philip G.
Altbach et al. eds., 2005).
21
JOHN D. SKRENTNY , T HE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 136, 193 (1996).
22
Id. at 138.
23
Id. at 195.
19
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necessary at the institutional level, and colleges and universities were the
right place for this change.24
As a result of these early affirmative action programs created by the
federal government, the adoption of affirmative action policies at colleges
and universities came in several different forms. Some institutions reacted
to the legislation of the mid-1900s described above by actively recruiting
minority students as a part of their educational mission.25 Consequently, in
order to increase minority enrollment, many of these same institutions
began to initiate admissions policies that took race into consideration.26
However, not every institution followed this trend and many affirmative
action programs were the result of coercion by the government. After the
passage of the Civil Rights Act, the federal government sought to
implement the goals of the statute by “demanding that colleges and
universities institute ‘Affirmative Action’ programs which would end all
forms of racial discrimination in the hiring of staff, admission of students,
granting of financial aid, and allocation of dormitory space.”27 Threats
were made to institutions such as Columbia, Harvard, Cornell, and
Michigan, to withhold federal funds if implementation of affirmative
action policies were too slow.28 A 1974 report published for the Carnegie
Commission in Higher Education also stated that many colleges and
universities were being forced to lower their overall academic standards in
order to meet the demands of affirmative action policies.29
Regardless of the reasons an institution chose to institute affirmative
action policies, it became clear that the demands from both the government
and the institutions themselves for the creation of such policies during the
1960s were the result of three challenges facing society.30 First, African
Americans were intentionally excluded from participation in certain
24

See B RIAN PUSSER, B URNING DOWN THE HOUSE 26 (2004) (stating that aggressive forms of
affirmative action were needed to remedy discrimination that could not be addressed by the Civil
Rights Act).
25
See Dorothy Garrison-Wade & Chance W. Lewis, Affirmative Action: History and Analysis, J.
C OLL. ADMISSIONS, Summer 2004, at 24 (noting that colleges reacted to President Johnson’s
Executive Order by actively recruiting minority students).
26
Id.
27
JOHN S. B RUBACHER & WILLIS R UDY , H IGHER E DUCATION IN TRANSITION 79 (4th ed.
2004).
28
Id.
29
Id. In addition to affirmative action policies, there was also some pressure during this time to
implement “open-admissions” policies at colleges and universities. In 1970, political pressure forced
the City University of New York’s Board of Higher Education to adopt a policy guaranteeing entrance
into some branch of the city’s higher education to all high school graduates. This policy granted
admission to graduates regardless of their academic standing. While there was much controversy over
this plan, it did prove successful as minority enrollment increased from 18.8% in 1969, which was the
year before the policy was implemented, to 35.6% in 1974. Id.
30
See John R. Howard, Affirmative Action in Historical Perspective, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ’ S
TESTAMENT OF HOPE 19, 30 (Mildred Garcia ed., 1997) (stating that “[t]he new social and intellectual
realities crystallized in three propositions which came to serve as the basis for new social policy”).
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31

aspects of society. “Second, it [became] necessary to act affirmatively to
eliminate institutional barriers to equal participation.”32 Finally, in order to
eliminate these barriers to equal participation, new standards were needed
to ensure access to education for groups suffering from the effects of
discrimination.33
Unfortunately, while affirmative action policies have the aim of
addressing these challenges, the aftermath of the proliferation of racebased affirmative action policies in colleges and universities during the
1960s and 1970s has had mixed results. Between 1954 and 1970, African
American enrollment in colleges in the North and West increased from
45,000 to 95,000, and in 1970 African American students made up seven
percent of all full time undergraduates in the United States.34 Despite these
gains, the percentage of college admissions of African American males
declined between 1976 and 1986,35 and there was little increase in African
American enrollment after 1976.36
The last two decades have seen a general trend of a growth in college
enrollment of underrepresented groups but the numbers are still low
despite the presence of race-based affirmative action policies. The number
of racial minority students in all four year institutions in 1995 stood at
1,866,600, which was approximately 21.5% of the total student
population.37 This figure was up from an enrollment of 931,000 minority
students in 1976.38 In 2000, African Americans constituted 11.3% of
overall college enrollment, while Latino students constituted 9.5% and
American Indians constituted 1%.39 Slight increases carried into 2007, as
the percentage of African American students was at 13.1% at the time and
the percentage of Latino students stood at 11.4%.40 Sadly, American
Indian enrollment remained at 1% of the student population.41 Again,
while these numbers are still too low given the growth in affirmative action
policies, it is important to note that without affirmative action policies

31

Id.
PUSSER, supra note 24, at 26 (citing Howard, supra note 30, at 30).
33
See Howard, supra note 30, at 30 (“Breaking down institutional barriers entailed reexamining
some of the criteria conventionally used to mediate access to schools, colleges, universities, and the
work place.”).
34
B RUBACHER & R UDY , supra note 27, at 80–81.
35
See id. at 400 (citing findings by the American Council on Education).
36
See id. (citing statistics derived from the U.S. Department of Education).
37
Chang et al., supra note 20, at 520.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 520 tbl.18.1.
40
NAT ’ L C TR. FOR E DUC. STATISTICS, TOTAL FALL E NROLLMENT IN DEGREE-GRANTING
INSTITUTIONS, BY R ACE /E THNICITY , SEX, ATTENDANCE STATUS, AND LEVEL OF STUDENT :
SELECTED YEARS, 1976 THROUGH 2007 (2008), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/
d08/tables/dt08_227.asp.
41
Id.
32
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enrollment of racial minority students would be even lower.
III. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE COURTS
A. Pretext to Bakke

Although Regents of the University of California v. Bakke43 marked the
first time the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the legality of affirmative
action policies in the college admissions process, there were several cases
prior to Bakke which prepared the way for the Court’s 1978 decision.
Among the first was Griggs v. Duke Power Co.44 Alleging a violation of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the plaintiffs in Griggs claimed that their
employer instituted a policy that made it nearly impossible for minority
applicants to gain employment in some of the divisions of the company.
According to their complaint, the employer had instituted a requirement
that all applicants possess a high school diploma and achieve a satisfactory
score on two professionally prepared aptitude tests before they could be
considered for employment within certain divisions.45 In finding for the
plaintiffs, the U.S. Supreme Court held that neither of these requirements
had a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for
which they were used and were thus invalid.46 The Court also found that
Title VII prohibited unnecessary hiring and employment policies that had a
disparate racial impact.47 This holding by the Court “set the stage for
[Bakke and] race conscious affirmative action in two ways.”48 First, the
holding hinted that a race conscious remedy is sometimes justified for the
removal of arbitrary obstacles to members of a minority group.49 Second,
“in holding that policies with disparate racial impact were actionable,
Griggs articulated a race-conscious standard for a prima facie violation of
Title VII.”50
Another case that served as a precursor to Bakke was Defunis v.
The plaintiff in Defunis brought suit claiming that
Odegaard.51
preferences were given to non-resident minority students in the admissions
42
See Chang et al., supra note 20, at 529 (“[I]f colleges and universities were forced to admit
students based solely on grades and test scores, [African American student] enrollment at the nation’s
most selective colleges would likely plummet from about 6 percent to less than 2 percent.”).
43
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
44
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
45
Id. at 427–28.
46
Id. at 431.
47
Id. at 430–31.
48
Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. R EV.
1195, 1209 (2002).
49
Id. Anderson suggests that such a remedy to these obstacles could be actively recruiting
prospective employees from other racial groups. Id.
50
Id.
51
507 P.2d 1169 (Wash. 1973), dismissed as moot, 416 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1974).
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process for the University of Washington School of Law, yet no preference
was given to residents of the state of Washington.52 As a result of this
structure, the plaintiff was able to show that minority applicants were being
admitted to the school with lesser academic qualifications than those of the
The Supreme Court of
plaintiff and other resident applicants.53
Washington upheld the university’s affirmative action program, after the
trial court had found against the institution,54 holding that the program was
permissible under the Equal Protection Clause. Using language that
foreshadowed the majority opinion in Bakke, the court found that there was
a compelling state interest in promoting integration in public education and
producing a racially balanced student body.55 The court also found a
compelling interest in the state responding to the “shortage of minority
attorneys.”56 Unfortunately, this case was never decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court, despite the fact that it granted certiorari, because the Court
later found that the issue was moot.57
B. Bakke
Five years after DeFunis, the U.S. Supreme Court had another
opportunity to address the legality of race-based affirmative action policies
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.58 The plaintiff in
Bakke was a white male who had been rejected twice from the medical
school at the University of California at Davis.59 He brought suit claiming
that the school’s policy of reserving sixteen spots in the incoming class for
minority students was unconstitutional.60 The plaintiff also challenged the
school’s policy of evaluating minority candidates under a special
admissions program,61 which allowed them to remain separate from their
peers in the regular admissions program.62

52

Id. at 1171–72, 1176.
Id. at 1176–77.
54
Id. at 1188.
55
Id. at 1182.
56
Id. at 1184.
57
See Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1974) (“Because the petitioner will complete
his law school studies at the end of the term for which he has now registered regardless of any decision
this Court might reach on the merits of this litigation, we conclude that the Court cannot, consistently
with the limitations of Art. III of the Constitution, consider the substantive constitutional issues
tendered by the parties.”).
58
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
59
Id. at 276–77.
60
Id. at 275, 277–78.
61
Applicants under the special admissions program performed significantly worse at their
undergraduate institutions than Bakke did. Bakke’s grade point average as an undergraduate was 3.46.
For the class entering the medical school in 1973, the average grade point average of special admittees
was 2.88 and the average for the class entering in 1974 was 2.62. Id. at 277–78 n.7.
62
Id. at 274.
53
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When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Powell
articulated the test that would apply to future reviews of challenges to raceconscious affirmative action policies. In his “opinion of one,”64 Justice
Powell held that an admissions decision that is based on race would be
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if it could withstand
the “most exacting judicial examination.”65 Furthermore, Justice Powell
found that the university’s policies could only withstand such an
examination if it was “precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.”66 In determining which test to apply to a violation
of Title VI claim, Justice Powell held that the same standard would be
applied as under the Equal Protection Clause.67
Affirming the state court’s decision, Justice Powell found that while
there was a compelling governmental interest in remedying the effects of
past discrimination, there was no evidence that the current admissions
policies were intended to do just that.68 However, concerning what the
Court saw as the university’s primary purpose in implementing the
admissions policies at issue—ensuring a diverse student body—Powell
held that the attainment of a diverse student body “clearly is a
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”69
Justice Powell relied on the four essential freedoms of colleges and
universities articulated by Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire70 to argue that the freedom of a university to make its own
63
Finding that the university violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court of
California held the school’s affirmative action policies to be unconstitutional and ordered the plaintiff’s
admission to the medical school. Id. at 279–81. The court specifically stated that “[a]lthough [it]
agreed that the goals of integrating the medical profession and increasing the number of physicians
willing to serve members of minority groups were compelling state interests, it concluded that the
special admissions program was not the least intrusive means of achieving those goals.” Id. at 279.
64
Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Glass Half Full: Envisioning the Future of Race Preference
Policies, 63 N.Y.U. ANN . SURV . AM. L. 385, 387 (2008). Justice Powell wrote a majority opinion in
which four Justices concurred with his conclusion but did not join in his reasoning. Id. at 386. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun disagreed that the university’s admissions program was
unconstitutional. Bakke, 438 U.S at 325–26 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens, who was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, concurred
in the judgment in part and dissented in part because he found that since the university’s admissions
program violated Title VI, the Court did not need to consider the constitutional issue. Id. at 412–13
(Stevens, J., concurring with the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
65
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291.
66
Id. at 299.
67
Id. at 287. This was an important aspect of the holding because it meant that all private schools
which received federal funding were subject to this decision even though they were not subject to the
Equal Protection Clause.
68
Id. at 307, 309.
69
Id. at 311–12.
70
354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957). Concerning the four freedoms of a university, Justice Frankfurter
stated:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive
to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail
“the four essential freedoms” of a university—to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may
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judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.71
Despite this endorsement of university autonomy, in analyzing the policies
at the University of California, Justice Powell held that the “diversity that
furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a
single though important element.”72 Therefore, while the Court held that
diversity was a compelling governmental interest, it stated that race and
ethnicity could not be the only aspects considered when attempting to
achieve a diverse student body. Justice Powell also held that “admissions
programs, which take race into account in achieving the educational
diversity valued by the First Amendment,”73 can only deem race or ethnic
background as a “plus” in an applicant’s file.74 Stated another way, race
could not be a decisive factor in determining whether an applicant would
be admitted.75
C. Hopwood
Before the U.S. Supreme Court decided the University of Michigan
affirmative action cases, the state and federal courts had several
opportunities to address the precedent set in Bakke.76 Some jurisdictions at
this time were not persuaded by Powell’s decision and began to move
away from this precedent set by the Supreme Court. The most prominent
case which signaled this trend was Hopwood v. Texas.77
The plaintiffs here challenged the affirmative action programs at the
University of Texas School of Law under the Equal Protection Clause and
Title VI.78 Under the university’s admissions system, preference was
given to African American and Mexican American applicants by altering

be admitted to study.
Id. (citation omitted).
71
Bakke, 438 U.S at 312 (citation omitted).
72
Id. at 315.
73
Id. at 316.
74
Id. at 317.
75
Although Justice Powell received just one vote for his opinion, as mentioned earlier, four other
Justices—Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun—supported the inclusion of race in the college
admissions process and actually argued that the university’s use of race here was reasonable and thus
constitutional. Id. at 325–26, 376 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Perhaps this
is why the holding was so influential despite not carrying any other judges.
76
See, e.g., Davis v. Halpern, 768 F. Supp. 968, 975 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Bakke to discuss the
acceptable uses of race-based affirmative action plans); DeRonde v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 625 P.2d
220, 225 (Cal. 1981) (following the standards articulated by Powell to uphold the University of
California’s admissions policies); McDonald v. Hogness, 598 P.2d 707, 711–13 (Wash. 1979) (using
the holding in Bakke to find that the University of Washington’s affirmative action program did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause).
77
See 78 F.3d 932, 941–46 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussing the court’s departure from Bakke).
78
Id. at 938.
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79

their admissions score. In addition to maintaining different admissions
levels for minorities and whites, the law school established a segregated
application evaluation process as well.80
At the district court level, the University of Texas argued that there
were several justifications for their affirmative action policies, including
the need to achieve a diverse student body and the need to remedy the
present effects of past discrimination.81 In its examination of the
affirmative action policies, the district court found that these justifications
met “constitutional muster.”82 The court found against the University of
Texas, though, because its admissions program allowed for separate review
of minority applications and was not narrowly tailored.83
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s
holding and departed from the precedent established in Bakke. Concerning
the need to maintain a diverse student body, the court held that since
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke received only his own vote,84 it was not
binding precedent. As a result, the court found that it had the authority to
hold that the need to maintain a diverse student body was not a compelling
interest which could withstand strict scrutiny because “classification of
persons on the basis of race for the purpose of diversity frustrates . . . the
goals of equal protection.” 85
The court was also not persuaded by the university’s claim that the
policies were needed to remedy past discrimination. In order to pass
constitutional review, the court held that the state of Texas would have to
find that past segregation had present effects, it would have to determine
the magnitude of those present effects, and it would need to limit the
advantage provided to applicants to remedy that harm.86 Since these
elements were not present, the court found that the justification of
remedying past discrimination was not a viable defense for the university.87
The Hopwood decision severely restricted how colleges could decide
which students would be admitted to their student bodies. Although it did
79
Id. at 936 (“In March 1992, for example, the presumptive TI admission score for resident
whites and non-preferred minorities was 199. Mexican Americans and blacks needed a TI of only 189
to be presumptively admitted. The difference in the presumptive-deny ranges is even more striking.
The presumptive denial score for ‘nonminorities’ was 192; the same score for blacks and Mexican
Americans was 179.”). Consequently, minority students with lower grade point averages and LSAT
scores were being admitted over students from majority groups with higher grade point averages and
LSAT scores. Id.
80
Id. at 937.
81
Id. at 938.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 939.
84
Id. at 944 (“Justice Powell’s argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never
represented the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case.”).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 951.
87
Id.
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not create mandatory law at the national level, Hopwood served to produce
a significant effect on the educational institutions within the Fifth Circuit
by diminishing minority representation on their campuses.88 Institutions
were able to mitigate this effect of the decision over time,89 and the U.S.
Supreme Court had the opportunity nearly ten years later to revisit Bakke
and clarify its position on race-based affirmative action policies before
other circuits felt compelled to follow the precedent of Hopwood.90
D. The University of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases
The University of Michigan affirmative action cases were two distinct
cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2003 which constituted the
most anticipated civil rights decisions in a long period.91 Although the
Court only upheld the affirmative action policies of the University of
Michigan in one of these cases, both decisions looked to Bakke for
guidance and upheld Justice Powell’s majority opinion. Furthermore, and
perhaps more importantly, both decisions clearly established a path
colleges could take to ensure diversity within their campuses.92
In Gratz v. Bollinger,93 the plaintiffs sued the University of Michigan
claiming that its affirmative action program for the undergraduate school

88

After the Hopwood decision was rendered, there was a decline in African American and
Mexican American enrollment at the University of Texas School of Law. Since 1947, Texas had
enrolled and graduated more African American and Mexican American lawyers than any non-minority
law school in America. At one point, one out of every eleven Mexican American lawyers was a
graduate of the University of Texas School of Law. However, the year after Hopwood, African
American enrollment dropped to 0.9% of the incoming class and Mexican American enrollment fell to
5.6%. This was the lowest level for both groups since affirmative action was adopted at the university
in 1983. Gerald Torres, Grutter v. Bollinger/Gratz v. Bollinger: View from a Limestone Ledge, 103
C OLUM. L. R EV. 1596, 1597 (2003).
89
See id. at 1600 (finding that in 1997, the Texas Legislature enacted H.B. 588, which granted
high school seniors graduating in the top ten percent of their class automatic admission to their choice
of state university and the University of Texas has almost returned to its pre-Hopwood numbers
concerning minority enrollment).
90
Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not revisit this issue until 2003, the circuit courts had
several opportunities to produce their own opinions on the subject. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1245 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that Powell’s decision in Bakke was not
binding on this issue before the court); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1201 (9th
Cir. 2000) (holding that student body diversity could be a compelling interest which justified the use of
race-based preferences in admissions policies).
91
See David Schimmel, Commentary, Affirming Affirmative Action: Supreme Court Holds
Diversity to Be a Compelling Interest in University Admissions, 180 E DUC. L. R EP. 401, 401 (2003)
(“The two University of Michigan admissions cases were the most controversial and eagerly awaited
civil rights decisions in years.”).
92
See supra note 2. But see Barbara Lauriat, Note, Trump Card or Trouble? The Diversity
Rationale in Law and Education, 83 B.U. L. R EV. 1171, 1191 (2003) (“The ambiguity of Justice
O’Connor’s durational requirement for the use of race-conscious admissions to achieve diversity is
extremely troubling.”); Garrick B. Pursley, Note, Thinking Diversity, Rethinking Race: Toward a
Transformative Concept of Diversity in Higher Education, 82 TEX. L. R EV. 153, 154 (2003) (arguing
that Grutter has left uncertainty regarding the concept of diversity).
93
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI.
The district court
found that the university’s admissions office “consider[ed] a number of
factors in making admissions decisions, including high school grades,
standardized test scores, high school quality, curriculum strength,
geography, alumni relationships, and leadership.”95 The university used
these factors to assign each candidate a score as part of a selection index.96
Under the affirmative action program, a student who was a member of an
underrepresented group was entitled to an automatic twenty points.97
These additional points alone could move an applicant from the “rejection”
category to the “postpone or admit” category under the selection index.
Minority students could also be flagged by an admissions counselor and
receive additional review that was not available to students from majority
groups.98
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist used the district court’s
findings to invalidate the university’s affirmative action program.
Applying the strict scrutiny standard,99 the Court found that the policy of
awarding minority applicants an automatic twenty points made race a
decisive factor for admissions and was a violation of Bakke.100 The Court
also found that the awarding of points to minority applicants did not
provide individualized consideration of each student’s qualifications.101 As
a result, the undergraduate admissions policy could not survive the strict
scrutiny test because it was not narrowly tailored to achieve the
university’s compelling interest in achieving a diverse student body.102
Although decided at the same time as Grutter v. Bollinger,103 Chief
Justice Rehnquist relied somewhat on the majority opinion from Grutter in
writing the majority opinion for Gratz.104 Similar to Gratz, the plaintiff in
Grutter sued the University of Michigan, claiming that its law school
admissions policies violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI.
However, the affirmative action policies adopted by the law school’s
admissions department were significantly different than the policies used at
94

Id. at 252.
Id. at 253.
96
Id. at 255 (“This index was divided linearly into ranges generally calling for admissions
dispositions as follows: 100–50 (admit); 95–99 (admit or postpone); 90–94 (postpone or admit); 75–89
(delay or postpone); 74 and below (delay or reject).”).
97
Id.
98
Id. at 274.
99
Id. at 270 (“It is by now well established that ‘all racial classifications reviewable under the
Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized.’” (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 224 (1995))).
100
See id. at 272 (noting that Justice Powell allowed an applicant’s race to be considered without
being decisive in the decision making process).
101
Id. at 277.
102
Id. at 275.
103
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
104
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 277.
95
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the undergraduate level. The law school ranked each applicant according
to their performance as undergraduate students and on the LSAT, but high
achievement in these areas did not guarantee admission.105 Admissions
officers would also consider “soft variables” such as the quality of the
applicant’s undergraduate institution, the quality of the applicant’s essay,
and the applicant’s likely contributions to the intellectual and social life of
the law school.106 The goal of this policy was to achieve diversity at the
school by enrolling a “critical mass” of underrepresented minority
students,107 and, while the administration had a commitment to achieving
racial and ethnic diversity, it did not give that factor substantial weight
over all other factors nor did it define diversity only in terms of race.108
Using the strict scrutiny test,109 Justice O’Connor, writing for the
majority, adopted the precedent set in Bakke and found in favor of the
university.110 The Court agreed with Bakke that student body diversity is a
compelling governmental interest,111 and found that the university’s
admissions policy was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.112
Specifically, the Court noted that the holistic review of applicants adopted
by the admissions policy was flexible enough to ensure individual
treatment of each student.113 The Court also found that there was no policy
of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single “soft” variable,
such as race,114 and the desire to enroll a “critical mass” of
underrepresented students did not alter this flexibility.115 These several
findings by the Court were, in its own words, consistent with the “tradition
of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within
constitutionally prescribed limits.”116 However, it is important to note that
105

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315.
Id.
107
Id. at 316.
108
Id. at 315–16.
109
Id. at 326.
110
See id. at 323 (“Justice Powell’s opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has served as
the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies.”).
111
Id. at 325. In addition to relying on the precedent in Bakke, the Court gave several of its own
reasons why it believed that diversity in the student body was a compelling interest. First, it found that
education was the foundation of good citizenship and therefore the “diffusion of knowledge” must be
accessible to all individuals. Second, the Court found that law schools in particular are training
grounds for the nation’s leaders and that in order to cultivate a legitimate set of leaders, it is necessary
that this path to leadership (i.e., higher education) be visibly open to individuals of every race and
ethnicity. Id. at 331–32.
112
Id. at 334. The Court did clearly articulate that to be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious
admissions program cannot use a quota system. Id.
113
Id. at 337.
114
Id. Justice O’Connor noted additionally that all applicants have the opportunity to highlight
their own potential diversity contributions through the submission of a personal statement, letters of
recommendation, and an essay, and that the school gives substantial weight to diversity factors besides
race. Id. at 338.
115
Id. at 340.
116
Id. at 328.
106
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while the Court upheld the use of the university’s affirmative action
policies, it indicated that the justifications which it relied on were not fixed
in time.117
In sum, Grutter stands for the rule that diversity is a compelling state
interest that will justify the use of race in the admissions process so long as
each applicant is evaluated on an individual basis and race serves as only
one factor among many that are considered.118 In combination with Gratz
and Bakke, universities also understood that Grutter prohibited the use of
quotas and the adoption of separate review processes for minority
students.119 Nor could universities use race-based affirmative action
policies as a permanent means of achieving a racial diverse student
body.120 Finally, Grutter also required that universities should actively and
in good faith consider race neutral alternatives for achieving diverse
student bodies.121
While the ruling of Grutter was heralded by many as a victory for
affirmative action and as a clear map for universities to implement their
own affirmative action policies,122 it was just as quickly condemned by
members of the legal community as well.123 Regardless of criticism toward
the decision, the Michigan affirmative action cases represented the law of
the land for several years. As the next section of this Note indicates, this
law changed somewhat for universities in 2007 when the U.S. Supreme
Court decided Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1.124

117
See id. at 341–42 (noting that solidifying a permanent justification for racial preferences would
offend the fundamental equal protection principle of doing away with all government-imposed
discrimination based on race). But see Peter Schmidt, Researchers Bemoan Lack of Progress in
Closing Education Gaps Between the Races, C HRON . HIGHER E DUC. (Wash., D.C.), Mar. 26, 2008,
http://chronicle.com/article/Researchers-Bemoan-Lack-of/624/ (noting the findings of a group of
affirmative-action advocates and researchers: “Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was far too optimistic in
projecting, in the [Supreme Court’s] 2003 Grutter v. Bollinger decision upholding colleges’ use of
race-conscious admissions policies, that within 25 years selective colleges would be able to enroll
sufficiently diverse student bodies without the use of such policies.”).
118
See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
119
See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
120
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
121
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
122
See supra note 2.
123
See, e.g., Lauriat, supra note 92, at 1173. Lauriat argues that the Court was wrong in Grutter
and the opinion is “flawed in its analysis and conclusion that student-body diversity can serve as a
compelling government interest to justify the use of race-based preferences in higher education
admissions policies.” Id. She also claims there are strong public policy reasons against the use of
racial diversity as a criterion for giving advantages in admissions, such as the fact that these programs
foster racial stereotyping. Id. at 1197.
124
127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
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IV. THE LEGACY OF PARENTS INVOLVED IN HIGHER EDUCATION
A. Parents Involved
When the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear Parents Involved in
2006, there had already been several changes to the makeup of the
Court.125 Since the authors of the two University of Michigan affirmative
action cases were no longer on the bench, many spectators were unsure
how the “new” Court would decide this issue.126
Parents Involved was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court with a
companion case, McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools.127 The
plaintiffs in Jefferson County, parents of students enrolled at the Jefferson
County Public Schools system, sued the county claiming that its school
assignment plan violated the Equal Protection Clause.128 Under the
assignment plan, if a traditional public school in the county became oversubscribed, the school board would decide where a student would enroll
based on factors such as place of residence, school capacity, and program
popularity.129 If a school remained over-subscribed after consideration of
these factors, applicants were separated and randomly sorted into four lists
at each grade level: Black Male, Black Female, White Male, and White
Female.130 Students were then selected by the principals in a manner that
would keep the schools within the racial guidelines of the assignment
plan.131
Concerning the magnet schools, students were normally assigned to
the school closest to where he or she resided unless that school exceeded
its capacity or “hover[ed]” at the extreme ends of the racial guidelines.132
Other factors that were considered besides race included student essays,
recommendations, a work sample or audition, attendance data, and
standardized test scores.133 Therefore, in assigning students to the magnet
schools, “race [wa]s simply one possible factor among many, acting only
125
Justice O’Connor, the author of Grutter, had retired and been replaced by Justice Alito, while
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of Gratz, had passed away and was succeeded by Chief Justice
Roberts. See Supreme Court Nominations Research Guide, http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/guides/
supreme_court_nominations.cfm (last visited July 21, 2009) (indicating that Justice Alito was
confirmed on January 31, 2006, to replace Justice O’Connor, and Chief Justice Roberts was confirmed
on September 29, 2005, to replace Chief Justice Rehnquist).
126
See, e.g., Selingo, supra note 6.
127
330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004), aff’d, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert granted sub
nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct 2351 (2006), rev’d sub nom. Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
128
Jefferson County, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 836.
129
Id. at 842.
130
Id. at 847.
131
Id. The assignment plan required schools in the county to seek a black student enrollment of at
least fifteen percent and no more than fifty percent. Id. at 842.
132
Id. at 844.
133
Id. at 845.
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occasionally as a permissible ‘tipping’ factor in most of the [school]
assignment process.”134
The district court first found that the assignment plan for nontraditional magnet schools in the district was permissible under the
Constitution.135 In doing so, the court held that the school district “met its
burden of establishing a compelling interest in maintaining racially
integrated schools.”136 The court went on to find that the assignment plan
was narrowly tailored because it did not operate as a quota,137 it allowed
for individualized review,138 it did not unduly harm any member of a racial
group,139 and it gave serious, good faith consideration of race-neutral
alternatives to achieve its goals.140
However, the court did find that the plan’s assignment of students to
traditional high schools was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.141
Specifically, the portion of the assignment plan that placed applicants in
schools based on race was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly
tailored to meet the objective of achieving diversity in the student body.142
The court found that the plan made race the defining feature of a student’s
application,143 which was in violation of Grutter. The court also found that
the plan was not narrowly tailored because the assignment process put
applicants on separate assignment tracks based on race and the plan’s use
of the separate lists was completely unnecessary to accomplish the Board’s
goal.144 This decision of the district court was affirmed by the Sixth
Circuit in a unanimous decision with no written opinion.145
The claim in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1146 was similar to that of Jefferson County. Here, a group of
134

Id. at 859.
Id. at 837.
136
Id. at 855. The court was compelled by the arguments in Grutter which found that there was a
compelling interest in maintaining a racially integrated university. It held that “[l]ike institutions of
higher education, elementary and secondary schools are ‘pivotal to ‘sustaining our political and cultural
heritage’ with a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society.’” Id. at 852–53 (citation
omitted).
137
Id. at 858.
138
Id. at 859.
139
Id. at 861.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 837.
142
Id. at 864.
143
Id. at 863.
144
Id. at 862. Concerning the claim that the plan was not necessary to accomplish the Board’s
goal, the court argued that “[u]nder the general law of probabilities, if applicants were selected off of
one random draw list, the ratio of Black to White students in the applicant pool at a particular school
would be reflected in the ratio of Black to White students in the pool of admitted students and,
consequently, in the school’s student population at large.” Id. at 863.
145
See McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir.
2005) (“Because the reasoning which supports judgment for defendants has been articulated in the
well-reasoned opinion of the district court, the issuance of a detailed written opinion by this court
would serve no useful purpose.”).
146
426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
135
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parents sued their school district claiming that the district’s use of a racebased tiebreaker in determining which high schools students could enroll
violated state law, the Equal Protection Clause, and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act.147 Under this tiebreaker system, when a school had become
oversubscribed, the school board chose who could attend a school based on
four tiebreakers.148 The plaintiffs’ suit was based on the second tiebreaker
which looked at a student’s race if “the racial make up of [the school’s]
student body differ[ed] by more than 15 percent from the racial make up of
the students of the Seattle public schools as a whole—and if the sibling
preference [did] not bring the oversubscribed high school within plus or
minus 15 percent of the District’s demographics . . . .”149
The district court here found in favor of the school district,150 and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding a compelling governmental interest in
promoting diversity in the classrooms and in “ameliorating real,
identifiable de facto racial segregation.”151 The court also found that the
district’s use of a race-based tiebreaker was narrowly tailored because it
did not constitute a quota system,152 and it did not unduly harm any
student.153 The court did place a limit on its ruling, however, indicating
that the plans would not be permitted indefinitely.154
Finding that both Parents Involved and Jefferson County presented the
same underlying legal question,155 the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear
147

Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1171.
Id. at 1169. The tiebreakers were as follows: first, students who have a sibling attending that
school are admitted; second, if an oversubscribed high school is racially imbalanced the race of the
applying student is considered; third, students are admitted according to distance from the student’s
home to the high school; fourth, a lottery is used to allocate the remaining seats. Id. at 1169–71.
149
Id. at 1169. If this situation is present, then the school is considered racially imbalanced. The
court provides an example of this imbalance:
[I]f a school has more than 75 percent nonwhite students (i.e., more than 15 percent
above the overall 60 percent nonwhite student population) and less than 25 percent
white students, or when it has less than 45 percent nonwhite students (i.e., more than
15 percent below the overall 60 percent nonwhite student population) and more than
55 percent white students, the school is considered racially imbalanced.
Id. at 1170.
150
Id. at 1192–93.
151
Id. at 1178.
152
See id. at 1186 (“[T]he District’s 15 percent plus or minus trigger point tied to the
demographics of the Seattle school population is not a quota. It is a context-specific, flexible
measurement of racial diversity designed to attain and maintain a critical mass of white and nonwhite
students in Seattle’s public high schools.”).
153
Id. at 1192. The court gave three reasons why students were not unduly harmed. “[First,] the
District is entitled to assign all students to any of its schools. [Second,] no student is entitled to attend
any specific school. [And finally, third,] the tiebreaker does not uniformly benefit any race or group of
individuals to the detriment of another . . . .” Id.
154
Quoting Grutter, the court expected that the district would review its plan annually so that in
twenty-five years the use of racial preferences would not be necessary. Id.
155
This question was whether a public school that had not operated legally segregated schools or
has been found to be unitary may choose to classify students by race and rely upon that classification in
making school assignments. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2746 (2007).
148
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156

both appeals jointly
and, subsequently, found that both assignment
programs were unconstitutional. Consistent with Bakke and the University
of Michigan cases, the Court applied the strict scrutiny test to both
claims157 and articulated only two acceptable compelling interests for the
use of racial classifications: remedying the effects of past intentional
discrimination and, as articulated in Grutter, ensuring diversity in higher
education.158 Concerning the first compelling interest, the Court held that
neither school system could maintain its current assignment program based
on the interest of remedying the effect of past intentional discrimination.159
Regarding the second interest, the Court found that Grutter was limited to
universities only and “[t]he districts offer[ed] no evidence that the level of
racial diversity necessary to achieve the asserted educational benefits
happens to coincide with the racial demographics of the respective school
districts.”160
The Court went on to hold that even if the assignment plans were used
to achieve a compelling government interest, they could not pass the
narrowly tailored prong of the strict scrutiny test.161 Here, the Court found
that the two reassignment plans had only a marginal impact in the
assignment of students for achieving diverse student bodies and doubted
the necessity of using racial classifications.162 The Court also turned to
Grutter, which held that colleges must give good faith consideration to
race neutral alternatives before relying on race-based affirmative action

156

Id.
Id. at 2751–52.
158
Id. at 2752–53.
159
Id. at 2752. The Court found that the Seattle public schools had not shown that they were ever
segregated by law and were not subject to court-ordered desegregation decrees. Also, while the
Jefferson County schools were once previously segregated by law and were once subject to a courtordered desegregation decree, in 2000 the same court that ordered that decree dissolved it because it
found that the district had “eliminated the vestiges” connected with its former policy of segregation and
the “pernicious effects” of the decree had already been achieved. Id.
160
Id. at 2754, 2756. The Court refused to extend Grutter to this context despite the fact that two
circuit courts in these cases, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,
426 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) and McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Public
Schools, 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005), and one other circuit court, Comfort v. Lynn School
Community, 418 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2005), found that it did. Id. at 2754.
161
See id. at 2755 (noting that they did not have to respond to the amici dispute over whether the
diversity in these schools was a benefit because it was clear that the racial classifications were not
narrowly tailored).
162
Id. at 2759–60. In Seattle, the court found that “[e]ighty-four students were assigned to
schools that they did not list as a choice, but 29 of those students would have been assigned to their
respective school without the racial tiebreaker, and 3 were able to attend one of the oversubscribed
schools due to waitlist and capacity adjustments.” Id. at 2759. In Jefferson County, “[e]lementary
school students are assigned to their first- or second-choice school 95 percent of the time, and transfers,
which account for roughly 5 percent of assignments, are only denied 35 percent of the time—and
presumably an even smaller percentage are denied on the basis of the racial guidelines, given that other
factors may lead to a denial.” The county estimated that the racial guidelines account for only three
percent of assignments. Id. at 2760.
157
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programs, and found no evidence that either district considered nonexplicit racial classification.164 Finally, the Court noted that the use of race
in these two programs was used as a decisive factor that did not allow for
individualized review of each applicant.165
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in this decision was highly influential
because he provided the “swing vote” in favor of invalidating the two
student assignment plans.166 While Kennedy agreed that the assignment
plans at issue were unconstitutional, he was unable to join the Court
because they were “too dismissive of the legitimate interest government
has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their
race.”167 Also finding that “[t]he plurality opinion [wa]s at least open to
the interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore
the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling,”168 Justice Kennedy
wrote separately to voice his objection to the Chief Justice’s reasoning.
Justice Kennedy was also troubled by the argument that courts should
prohibit the use of race in school assignment plans unless it is used to
remedy the effects of de jure segregation.169 This was a mistake, according
to Kennedy, because limiting the Court’s power to remedying only de jure
segregation confines “the nature, extent, and duration of governmental
Therefore, Justice
reliance on individual racial classifications.”170
Kennedy supported the use of race to remedy both de jure and de facto
segregation.
B. Impact on Higher Education
Although Parents Involved is concerned with state action at the K–12
level, higher education administrators must still factor this holding into the
structure of their school’s affirmative action policies. There is a tradition
in the American judicial system of courts either applying or following
holdings involving K–12 schools in cases where one of the parties is a
university or college. Therefore, it is likely that courts will look to Parents
Involved when deciding future disputes involving affirmative action
policies at the university level. An example of this trend can be seen in the

163

Id. at 2760.
Id.
Id. at 2753–54.
166
Garfield, supra note 64, at 411. Some have argued that because Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence was so influential as the deciding vote, it will likely emerge as the foundation for future
race-based preference cases. See, e.g., id. at 416.
167
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); see also id. at 2797 (“A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest
that a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue.”).
168
Id. at 2791.
169
Id. at 2796.
170
Id.
164
165
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holding of Healy v. James.
In Healy, the Supreme Court applied its
ruling from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,172 concerning student speech, to the university setting.173 Quoting
the often-cited precedent from Tinker, the Healy Court stated that “[a]t the
outset we note that state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune
from the sweep of the First Amendment. ‘It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’”174
Turning back to the impact of Parents Involved on higher education, it
is important to understand from the beginning that Grutter is still good law
and that the holding of Parents Involved has not been incorporated into
higher education and will not be part of higher education law until a case is
before the courts which warrants its application. In addition, both the
Parents Involved Court and Justice Kennedy in his concurrence upheld
Grutter. Therefore, there is little doubt that the precedent of Grutter is
controlling law for race-based affirmative action cases. Specifically,
Parents Involved found that “what was upheld in Grutter was
consideration of ‘a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.’”175
With this statement, the Court acknowledged that race could still be
considered in the admissions process for colleges and universities. As a
result, college administrators should continue to design their affirmative
action programs concerning the assignment of weight to the applicant’s
race and ethnicity within the guidelines established by Grutter. However,
while Grutter remains good law, it is highly likely that in future lawsuits,
courts will turn to Parents Involved along with Grutter. Therefore, the
holding of Parents Involved cannot be ignored by college administrators
despite the fact that Grutter has yet to be overruled. Even for colleges and
universities that do not violate the requirements set in Grutter, courts may
still find such policies unconstitutional due to the underlying goals of the
policies or the methods in which the policies were created. By following
both the holdings of Parents Involved and Grutter, colleges and
universities will avoid an unfavorable holding if faced with a lawsuit.
1. Schools Must Exhibit Significant Success Rates
Under the first restriction articulated by the Parents Involved opinion,
the Court implied that minor gains in generating a diverse student body
will not survive the strict scrutiny test. The Parents Involved Court
171

408 U.S. 169 (1972).
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Healy, 408 U.S. at 180.
174
Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
175
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2753.
172
173
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highlighted that the major argument of the two school districts in support
of their assignment plans was that the use of individual race classifications
for the assignment of students was necessary to achieve the goals of
maintaining diverse student bodies.176 The Court was not persuaded by
this argument because of the minimal effect the racial classifications had
on student assignments overall.177 Specifically, the Court surmised that
because race had such a minimal effect on student assignments, other
means that did not use race as a factor would have been more effective.178
The Court then pointed out that, unlike in Seattle and Louisville, the
use of race in the admissions policies at the University of Michigan was
“indispensable” because it had more than tripled the minority
representation at the law school.179 Therefore, the Court hinted that, in the
future, schools that implement race-based affirmative action programs will
need to show significant success rates in enrolling minority students.
While this “new” rule is not dispositive in determining the legality of
affirmative action policies since it was not a rule articulated in Grutter, it
will likely be a persuasive measure on a court in the future. Also, although
there is not a bright-line rule for what courts will consider a suitable impact
on minority enrollment for upholding race-based affirmative action
policies, it is important to note that in Parents Involved the Court was not
persuaded by programs that yielded an effect on only three percent of
school assignments or in situations where the use of race had no effect on
over one-third of the students subject to the plan.180
2. Alternatives to Race-Based Affirmative Action Must Be Seriously
Considered
This first way Parents Involved will impact college admissions serves
as a good transition into the second impact the decision will have on the
use of race-based affirmative action programs. As mentioned above, the
fact that the assignment plans at issue in Parents Involved had a minimal
impact on the actual assignment of students brought the Court to the
conclusion that other effective alternatives must have existed. If favorable
race-neutral alternatives exist, then a plan that employs the consideration
176

Id. at 2759.
Id.
178
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
179
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760.
180
A research consortium known as Project Seaphe, with members who include sociologists,
economists, and law professors, intend to perform at least eighteen different studies using the
information they obtained from higher education institutions, with the intention of finding out the
effects of race-based affirmative action. Among the areas this group will examine include “whether
minority students granted admissions preferences are disproportionately likely to drop out of
undergraduate science programs, whether or how various admissions preferences affect undergraduate
retention rates, and how the use of preferences affects social interactions on campuses.” Peter Schmidt,
Scholars Mount Sweeping Effort to Measure Effects of Affirmative Action in Higher Education,
C HRON . HIGHER E DUC. (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 18, 2008, at A19.
177
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of race will not be considered narrowly tailored.
The Parents Involved
Court found that the Seattle district rejected several race-neutral
alternatives with little or no consideration while Jefferson Country did not
show any evidence that it considered any alternatives.182 Although the
Grutter Court articulated the need to consider race-neutral alternatives,
Parents Involved strengthened this requirement183 by clearly articulating
that it was one of several controlling factors in its decision to strike down
the assignment plans.184
In addition to considering race-neutral alternatives, it is apparent from
Parents Involved that colleges and universities must clearly document their
consideration of these alternatives as well to provide evidence to courts of
this step in their decision making process. Justice Kennedy provided a list
of alternatives to the assignment plans used by the school districts in his
concurrence which gives some insight into what future courts will look for
universities to have considered. Kennedy argued:
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together
students of diverse backgrounds and races through other
means, including strategic site selection of new schools;
drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the
demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for
special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted
fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other
statistics by race. These mechanisms are race conscious but
do not lead to different treatment based on a classification
that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race, so it
is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be
found permissible.185
While not all of these alternatives are available to colleges and universities,
181
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760 (emphasizing that “[n]arrow tailoring requires ‘serious,
good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives’” (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 339 (2003))).
182
Id.
183
While Grutter held that colleges and universities must consider race-neutral alternatives, the
Court provided the University of Michigan significant latitude in deciding which alternatives they were
going to consider. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340 (holding that the district court erred in finding that the
law school was at fault for failing to consider the use of a lottery system or placing less emphasis on
GPA and LSAT scores because such alternatives would require too many sacrifices in terms of
academic quality or diversity).
184
See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760 (“The districts have also failed to show that they
considered methods other than explicit racial classifications to achieve their stated goals. Narrow
tailoring requires ‘serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.’” (citation
omitted)). While the Grutter Court first articulated the need for “serious, good faith consideration of
workable race-neutral alternatives,” the Court failed to dictate what steps a university must take to
fulfill this requirement. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339–40. Parents Involved provides a much stricter
requirement and more detailed map of what universities must do. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760.
185
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792.
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such as drawing attendance zones, the Court provides some guidance to
colleges and universities for achieving this requirement.
For advice on race neutral alternatives geared toward higher education,
colleges and universities can turn to a 2004 report by the U.S. Department
of Education (“DOE”) which lists several alternatives to race-based
affirmative action policies.186 In formulating these alternatives, the DOE
analyzed current alternatives used by colleges and universities across the
country and listed those that have been successful in enrolling a significant
number of minority students.187 For example, the DOE noted:
Many colleges and universities around the country are
partnering with elementary and secondary schools,
recognizing that these partnerships expand their educational
mission by giving them an opportunity to put into practice
education theory. Moreover, institutions recognize that
helping to better educate young people who attend
traditionally low-performing schools will broaden the pool of
students who can qualify for admission to college.188
The report also pointed out that several colleges have partnered with
secondary schools to assist with teacher shortages.189 This effort by
colleges and universities will also help prepare K–12 students for college.
Concerning financial aid, the DOE noted that institutions would use
scholarships to target specific populations such as low-income students or
students attending high schools which were underrepresented at that
specific institution.190 At the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
the school created an initiative to give the children of low-income families
an opportunity to attend college without borrowing the funds to do so.
Entitled the “Carolina Covenant,” the scholarship program “will enable
low-income students to graduate debt-free if they work on campus [ten] to
[twelve] hours weekly in a federal work-study job.”191
There are also alternatives available for race-based affirmative action
policies in graduate school admissions as well. The DOE listed the efforts
by the University of California which implemented a program that enrolls
disadvantaged or underserved undergraduates and brings them to either the
Irvine or Santa Cruz campuses to work with faculty mentors in order to
186
U.S. DEP’T OF E DUC., OFFICE FOR C IVIL R IGHTS, ACHIEVING DIVERSITY : R ACE NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES IN AMERICAN E DUCATION 13–79 (2004).
187
See id. at 23 (stating that the University of Florida increased race neutral outreach, created new
recruitment materials that emphasized diversity, and provided scholarships to disadvantaged students).
188
Id. at 24.
189
See id. at 21 (noting that Texas A&M University “pledged to increase annual graduation rates
of mathematics, science, technology and foreign language teachers by more than 250 percent in each
category, as well as the number of bilingual and special education teachers by over 170 percent”).
190
Id. at 41.
191
Id. at 43.
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prepare them to apply to graduate school.
Aside from the alternatives suggested by the DOE report, another
possible race neutral alternative that can be imposed by colleges and
universities includes establishing top percentage plans similar to that of the
State of Texas after the Hopwood decision.
Top percentage plans work for blacks (and Hispanics as well)
where there is, ironically, rigid separation in residential areas
and schools. Where there are many all or nearly all black
high schools, a college that desires diversity but is prohibited
from using affirmative action could switch to a system based
on class standing.193
However, this plan will not work where high schools are integrated.194
Also, this plan has been criticized, as used in Texas and Florida, by the
United States Commission on Civil Rights because the programs do not
admit to college the same proportion of minority students as are admitted
under race-based affirmative action plans.195 Percentage plans and their
inability to replace affirmative action programs will be discussed further in
Part V.
3. Goals to Enroll a Predetermined Range Should Be Eliminated
The third impact Parents Involved will have on higher education
concerns the target ranges of students schools adopt as part of their
admissions policies. The Court in Parents Involved found that for both
Seattle and Louisville, “the school district relie[d] upon an individual
student’s race in assigning that student to a particular school, so that the
racial balance at the school falls within a predetermined range based on the
racial composition of the school district as a whole.”196 This range was
“set solely by reference to the demographics of the respective school
districts.”197 Looking back at Grutter, the Court noted that the number of
minority students the school wanted to admit was an undefined
“meaningful number” that the school felt was “necessary to achieve a
genuinely diverse student body.”198 Although the use of quotas is barred
from affirmative action policies, the Grutter Court did allow the university
192
See id. at 54 (noting that the program is entitled the Summer Undergraduate Research
Fellowship (“SURF”) program).
193
Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the Condition and
Theory, 43 B.C. L. R EV. 521, 546 (2002).
194
Id.
195
Id. at 547.
196
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2746 (emphasis
added). Seattle’s expert stated that the sufficient number of students under this range is the amount
which will allow students to avoid “‘feeling any kind of specter of exceptionality.’” Id. at 2756
(citation omitted).
197
Id. at 2757.
198
Id. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003)).
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to apply a less rigid number scheme for admitting minority students. The
“predetermined range” adopted by the school districts in Parents Involved
seems to be in line with the “meaningful number” goal in Grutter, yet the
Parents Involved Court has made it clear that the use of such arbitrary
numbers will not be permissible even if they are not considered quotas.199
Therefore, while Grutter allowed the use of ranges for enrollment goals, it
is evident that the Court today would not permit it. Specifically, Parents
Involved held that “[t]his working backward to achieve a particular type of
racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of
the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw
under our existing precedent.”200 Although Grutter is still good law, the
Court clearly articulated its displeasure with the precedent on this issue, so
colleges and universities will likely need to follow the holding of Parents
Involved on this matter. If schools do promote a “meaningful number” or
seek to enroll a “critical mass,” then Parents Involved suggests that that
number should be based on well-researched gains the school will receive
from admitting that range of students.201 However, it may be best for
colleges to eliminate ranges or numeric goals since it is disfavored by the
Court, or, as the Court suggests, colleges should base their numeric goals
through forward looking processes rather then looking backward to
establish the range.
4. Themes of Overall Impact
As this section indicates, the impact of Parents Involved on the higher
education setting is subtle. However, this does not mean admissions
offices are free to design their affirmative action policies solely in
accordance with the 2003 University of Michigan cases. The several types
of impact Parents Involved will have on higher education can be summed
up in three different themes. One theme that emerges is that colleges and
universities should clearly document their affirmative action policies and
the decision making processes that led to their implementation. In
particular, institutions should document all alternatives to race-based
affirmative action programs attempted and considered. If a suit is ever
brought against a school, this documentation will be extremely beneficial.
A second theme derived from the impact of the case is that schools must do
their homework. Courts will want to see that institutions have come up
with plausible and effective alternatives to race-based affirmative action
199
See id. at 2756 (“The districts offer no evidence that the level of racial diversity necessary to
achieve the asserted educational benefits happens to coincide with the racial demographics of the
respective school districts—or rather the white/nonwhite or black/“other” balance of the districts, since
that is the only diversity addressed by the plans.”).
200
Id. at 2757.
201
See id. at 2755 (criticizing the two assignment plans because the number of minority students
sought were not connected to any need for a certain level of diversity).
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programs and they will want to see why current affirmative action policies
have been deemed most beneficial for meeting the goals of the school.
Schools that articulate that they are seeking to enroll a “meaningful
number” of minority students will also need to show the beneficial effect
that number will have on their student body and the overall goals of the
institution. Finally, the Parents Involved holding suggests that courts will
want affirmative action policies to be as efficient as possible. The Court
expressed this theme through its distaste for arbitrary student ranges. Also,
the Court established this theme by mandating that schools be able to show
that their affirmative action policies produce significant results. Again,
while Bakke remains good law, college administrations must be cognizant
of the impact of Parents Involved and the themes listed above. If colleges
and universities adhere to these themes and follow the precedent of both
Parents Involved and Grutter, the longevity of their affirmative action
programs is likely assured.
5. Evidence of Parents Involved’s Impact
Recently, the Western District of Texas had the opportunity to address
“one of the first legal attempts to roll back”202 the 2003 University of
Michigan cases in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.203 Here, the
plaintiffs, who were Caucasian, had applied to and were both rejected from
the University of Texas at Austin.204 They sued several defendants
claiming that the university’s admissions policies discriminated against
them on the basis of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
and Civil Rights Acts.205 In finding that the University of Texas’s
affirmative action policies were constitutional, the court relied heavily on
Grutter and the standard established within that case.206 However, the
plaintiffs turned to the holding of Parents Involved, albeit unsuccessfully,
to support their argument that the university’s policies were in violation of
federal law.207
In supporting the argument of this Note that Parents Involved will have
an influence on future affirmative action disputes concerning the college
admissions process, the court did not dismiss the plaintiff’s reliance on
Parents Involved due to the fact that it was a K–12 case. Instead, the court
performed a detailed analysis of Parents Involved, implying that the case
was relevant in this situation.208 Specifically, the court found that the
202
Scott Jaschik, Court Win for Affirmative Action, INSIDE H IGHER E D , Aug. 18, 2009,
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/08/18/texas.
203
No. A-08-CA-263-SS, 2009 WL 2513291 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2009).
204
Id. at *1.
205
Id.
206
See id. at *11–14 (analyzing Fisher using the Grutter standards).
207
See id. at *20 (using Parents Involved to measure the effect of a “narrowly tailored” plan).
208
See id. at *20–21 (examining Parents Involved and comparing it to Fisher).
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university’s affirmative action policies were not unconstitutional because,
unlike the school districts in Parents Involved, “UT’s admissions policy
does not make race ‘the’ factor nor rely on racial classifications in a
‘nonindividualized mechanical’ way. UT has not only considered but
continues to use race-neutral alternatives in addition to its consideration of
race.”209
While the court did reject the plaintiffs’ argument that the university’s
affirmative action policies were not narrowly tailored because it produced
minimal gains in admitting under-represented students,210 it is still
important to note that this argument was raised and analyzed by the court.
Therefore, although the Western District of Texas rejected this argument,
this Note contends that it is likely that another district or federal circuit will
be persuaded by it.
The impact of Fisher on higher education law cannot be overlooked.
Although only a district court case, it stands for the proposition that
Parents Involved is not restricted to fact patterns involving K–12 schools.
It also establishes that Parents Involved will have a significant effect on
affirmative action cases involving colleges and universities. This case
legitimizes arguments that focus on a university’s use of race-neutral
alternatives and the success of a university’s affirmative action policies
which are generally based on the standards articulated in Parents Involved.
Given the effect Parents Involved will have on future affirmative action
cases, the next Part of this Note argues that the line should be drawn here
concerning restrictions on the autonomy of a university to select its own
student body.
V. THE BENEFITS OF DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION
FOR STUDENTS AND SOCIETY
While the precedent concerning race-based affirmative action policies
post-Parents Involved does allow significant autonomy for colleges and
universities to recruit and admit minority applicants, the courts should not
look to place any additional restrictions or requirements on how
admissions departments operate. Research indicates that college students
who are part of a racially diverse educational community will benefit in
terms of their development, both as students and as young adults, and
society too will benefit from the presence of fully developed college
graduates.211 In order to achieve the optimal levels of diversity needed to
ensure these benefits, race-based affirmative actions policies must be used,
209

Id. at *21.
See id. (“Thus, the mere fact that UT’s consideration of race does not have a large effect on
diversity, due largely to the overwhelming presence of the Top Ten Percent law, does not mean the
policy fails to further UT’s compelling interest or is in some way not narrowly tailored for that goal.”).
211
See infra Part V.A.
210
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and any additional restraints placed on college admissions departments
could lead to the elimination of these beneficial environments.
A. Specific Benefits to Society and Individuals
The benefits to American society and businesses of having students
who have graduated from diverse colleges and universities are thoroughly
articulated by Derek Bok, former president of Harvard University. Bok
claims that “[a] successful democracy demands tolerance and mutual
respect from different groups within its citizenry in order to contain the
religious and ethnic tensions that have riven so many countries around the
world.”212 College students who are educated in racially diverse
environments learn this required tolerance and respect.213 Bok also found
that some scholars have reported that those students who interact across
racial lines become more civically active, more inclined to help others, and
more committed to improving their communities than their classmates who
do not experience the same cross-racial contacts.214 Finally, Bok has found
that employers look for students who can work effectively with a diverse
group of employees and clients because of the growing number of
minorities and immigrants.215 Another benefit to businesses from diversity
in higher education, which Bok does not argue but is nonetheless apparent,
is that “diversity promotes creativity and innovation, fosters problem
solving skills, and adds to organizational flexibility.”216
Aside from the benefits to society, research has also shown that the
cognitive and identity development of students is one major benefit of a
diverse educational environment.
Patricia Gurin argues that
“undergraduates are at a critical stage in their human growth and
development in which diversity, broadly defined, can facilitate greater
awareness of the learning process, better critical thinking skills, and better
preparation for the many challenges they will face as involved citizens in
an increasingly pluralistic and democratic society.”217 Gurin’s argument is
supported not only by her own work with student data from the University
of Michigan,218 but is also supported by the work of other social scientists.
212

DEREK B OK , OUR UNDERACHIEVING C OLLEGES: A C ANDID LOOK AT HOW M UCH
STUDENTS LEARN AND WHY T HEY SHOULD B E LEARNING M ORE 195 (2006).
213
See id. (stating that society has “much to gain from having students from diverse backgrounds
learn to live and work together on campus”).
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Benjamin Baez, Diversity and Its Contradictions, in R ACIAL AND E THNIC D IVERSITY IN
HIGHER E DUCATION 383, 385 (Caroline S. Turner et al. eds., 2002).
217
Jeffrey F. Milem & Kenji Hakuta, The Benefits of Racial and Ethnic Diversity in Higher
Education, in R ACIAL AND E THNIC DIVERSITY IN H IGHER E DUCATION 389, 392 (Caroline S.
Turner et al. eds., 2002).
218
Data was collected for use as evidence in Grutter and Gratz. The analyses were conducted to
document the educational outcomes for students across the nation and within the University of
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For example, one group of social scientists found that the level of
classroom diversity was related to small, yet significant, levels of students
reporting gains in their problem solving and group skills.219 This group
found that even medium levels of diversity—approximately thirty to forty
percent—“are positively, if not always significantly, related to a students’
reports of learning gains.”220 Research also shows that students who
engage in a diverse environment in college will show greater intellectual
engagement and academic motivation, higher satisfaction in their college
experience, and the ability to understand and appreciate the perspectives of
groups other than their own.221 Several of these personal developments
will lead directly to increased retention rates for students.222 Finally, it has
been found that diversity in higher education disrupts the cycle of
segregation between the majority and minority groups.223
While the above studies identify the benefits of a diverse student body,
it is also important to note the effects on individual students of having a
racially homogenous college environment. It has been found that
“[c]ampuses with high proportions of White students provide limited
opportunities for interaction across race/ethnicity barriers and limit student
learning experiences with socially and culturally diverse groups.”224 In
addition, on campuses with little racial diversity, members of
underrepresented groups are traditionally viewed as “tokens” by students
in the majority.225 “Tokenism contributes to the heightened visibility of the
underrepresented group, exaggeration of group differences, and the

Michigan. The analyses found that students who reported high levels of contact with diverse ideas,
information, and people were more likely to show growth in their active thinking process, show higher
levels of intellectual engagement, and were more likely to have higher post graduate aspirations. Id. at
394–95.
219
Patrick T. Terenzini et al., Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the Classroom: Does It Promote
Student Learning?, in R ACIAL AND E THNIC D IVERSITY IN H IGHER E DUCATION 411, 422 (Caroline
S. Turner et al. eds., 2002).
220
Id.
221
See Milem & Hakuta, supra note 217, at 397. A study of fifty-eight students at Amherst
College found that because they were learning within a diverse environment,
[t]hirty percent of the students reported changes in the way they saw people of both
different races and classes, and an additional 32 percent reported having learned
something about people of either other races or other classes. Of the remaining 38
percent, just over half felt that they had gained something from the classroom
comments of peers who differed from them in race and class.
Elizabeth Aries, At an Elite College, Race Influences Views of Diversity, C HRONICLE OF H IGHER
E DUC. (Wash., D.C.), Sep. 26, 2006, at B47. While these numbers were “encouraging,” it was also
noted that “much potential went unrealized.” Id.
222
Milem & Hakuta, supra note 217, at 397.
223
See id. at 395 (“As an institution becomes more structurally diverse, students are more likely to
have opportunities to socialize across racial groups and to discuss racial issues.”).
224
Sylvia Hurtado et al., Enhancing Campus Climates for Racial/Ethnic Diversity: Education
Policy and Practice, in R ACIAL AND E THNIC D IVERSITY IN H IGHER E DUCATION 671, 675 (Caroline
S. Turner et al. eds., 2002).
225
Id.
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distortion of images to fit existing stereotypes.”
Minority students can
also feel alienated by a predominately homogeneous environment;227
therefore, one could assume this could lead to high dropout rates.
Although producing a diverse student body is the first step to achieving
the benefits mentioned in this section, it is important that college
administrators do not stop there.
Colleges must also sustain an
environment that ensures students of different races and backgrounds
interact with each other. “[P]ositive learning outcomes, including
increased GPA and likelihood of persistence, are related to the quality of
interactions a student has with diverse others, as well as the institutional
support for diversity that a student perceives.”228 Multicultural educational
programming, through academic courses that deal directly with
multicultural issues, is one way to produce these beneficial interactions.229
One group of social scientists suggests that for these types of courses to be
most effective, they “should involve students in experiential learning using
methods such as role-playing, values clarification, and brainstorming.”230
However, it must be noted that even without efforts by college
administrators to promote interaction between racial groups, campuses that
are diverse will result in the higher likelihood that students will befriend
and interact with members of different racial groups.231
B.

Alternatives to Race-Based Affirmative Action Are Not a Suitable
Replacement

Some critics of race-based affirmative action policies argue that a
diverse student body, along with all the benefits that it provides, can be
achieved through admissions policies that do not consider race. One
popular argument, which has been researched extensively by sociologist
Thomas Kane, has favored the replacement of race-based affirmative
226
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See id. at 677–78 (finding that students’ perceptions of discrimination, stemming from a nondiverse student body, have a significant and negative effect on African American students’ grades,
leading these students to drop out).
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Susan R. Rankin & Robert D. Reason, Differing Perceptions: How Students of Color and
White Students Perceive Campus Climate for Underrepresented Groups, 46 J. C. STUDENT DEV. 43,
45 (2005).
229
See id. (noting that “[c]ompletion of an academic course that addresses issues of diversity was
related to decreases in racial bias”). The authors also found that the completion of a diversity course
was linked to “increased ‘quality of students’ experiences with diverse peers [and] commitment to
social action.” Id. (alteration in original).
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Ambika Bhargava et al., An Investigation of Students’ Perceptions of Multicultural Education
Experiences in a School of Education, M ULTICULTURAL E DUC., Summer 2004, at 22 (citing E.C.
Globetti et al., Social Interaction and Multiculturalism, 30 NASPA J. 209 (1993)).
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See Cindy Weiss, Racial Diversity on College Campuses Benefits Students, Says Sociologist,
ADVANCE (Univ. of Conn., Storrs, Conn.), Nov. 3, 2008, at 8 (citing a study by sociologist Mary
Fischer, which found that “in the schools with greater diversity, students from all racial and ethnic
groups came to have more diverse friendship networks,” and that “[t]his effect was particularly strong
for white students”).
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action policies with income or class-based affirmative action programs. In
studying this alternative, Kane found several factors which led to the
conclusion that income cannot be a substitute for race in affirmative
action.232 Kane first found, using data from the high school class of 1992,
that African Americans and Hispanics were about three times as likely to
have incomes under $20,000 when compared to white students; however,
African Americans and Hispanics represented less than half of the entire
low income population.233 As a result, while African Americans and
Hispanics were more likely to have low incomes, “their absolute numbers
still represented a minority of the total low-income population.”234 Kane
also found that among all low-income, high scoring youth, African
Americans and Hispanics made up only seventeen percent of the
population and even a smaller number, less than seven percent, made up
high school graduates with high test scores.235 Kane concluded that a
“college drawing from the general population would have to admit two
low-income students from the overall pool of high school graduates to
yield one black or Hispanic student.”236 This number increases when
looking at selective colleges. These colleges, which select students only
232
See Roland G. Freyer et al., An Economic Analysis of Color-Blind Affirmative Action, 24 J.L.
E CON . & ORG . 319, 321–22 (2008).
There are two distinct ways in which color-blind affirmative action is inherently
inefficient. First, in the short-run, when the distribution of traits in the applicant
pool may be taken as given, all affirmative action policies yield lower expected
performance among the selected than does laissez-faire. . . .
Second, color-blind affirmative action is likely to be inefficient over the longer run
as well, when one considers how the distribution of traits presented by applicants
will shift in response to the incentives created by colleges’ admissions policies. . . .
[C]olor-blind policies necessarily create a situation where the relative importance of
traits for enhancing an applicant’s prospects of being admitted diverges from the
relative significance of those traits for enhancing an applicant’s postadmissions
performance. . . . [T]his is never the case under optimal color-sighted policy. Thus,
to the extent that color-blind preferential policies distort applicants’ decisions to
acquire performance-enhancing traits prior to entering the selection competition,
additional inefficiencies will emerge.
Id. But see John P. Cronan, The Diversity Justification in Higher Education: Evaluating
Disadvantaged Status in School Admissions, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. R EV. 305, 308 (2001) (arguing that
using a comprehensive system of affirmative action that “considers both racial and non-racial factors
[to] indicate whether an applicant faced a disadvantaged past and would contribute to the diversity of
the institution” will incorporate the strengths of a class-based system while eliminating its weaknesses).
233
Thomas J. Kane, Misconceptions in the Debate Over Affirmative Action in College
Admissions, in R ACIAL AND E THNIC D IVERSITY IN H IGHER E DUCATION 750, 754 (Caroline S.
Turner et al. eds., 2002).
234
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235
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Id. Kane’s statistics show that if schools tried to maintain racial diversity by relying on family
income, then schools would have to reduce the likelihood of admissions of those with incomes between
$25,000 and $39,000 by 16.9 percentage points relative to students from families with incomes less
than $15,000. Schools would also have to give a disadvantage to students who had a parent with a
college degree and they would have to disfavor applicants from public schools and from urban areas.
Lastly, schools would have to place negative weight on SAT scores and the differential in GPA. Id. at
755–56.
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from the pool of high scoring students, would need to admit six students
under an income-based affirmative action policy to admit one African
American or Hispanic student.237
This trend articulated by Kane has been noted by legal scholars as
well. It has been argued by these scholars that income-based affirmative
action is unable to remedy the shortcomings of race-based affirmative
action policies.238 Specifically, it has been stated that income-based
affirmative action will not succeed in aiding the minority poor for two
reasons.239 “First, one must remember that minorities are minorities: there
are more white poor people than black and Latino poor people, even
though white poverty rates are lower than black and Latino poverty rates,”
and, as a result, affirmative action “slots” will go to white students based
on numbers alone.240 The second reason is that “the basic principles of
affirmative action weigh against the use of poverty-based affirmative
action as a tool for aiding the minority poor.”241 Since poor minority
students are “the bottom of the bottom” they are going to be
“underrepresented as beneficiaries of poverty-based affirmative action in
comparison with their proportion among the poor.”242
Evidence that income-based affirmative action cannot achieve the
same racial diversity as race-based affirmative action can be seen in the
effects California’s Proposition 209 has had on the state’s higher education
enrollment patterns.243 Proposition 209, which amended the state’s
constitution, holds that the state shall not “grant preferential treatment to,
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or
237
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See, e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL
E DUC. 452, 465 (1997) (noting that it is a dangerous misconception to think that income-based
affirmative action can succeed where race-based affirmative action failed).
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Id. Malamud offers some statistics from a study performed by Maria Cancian at the LaFollette
Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin to support her claims. Cancian’s data was
derived from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. She found that the students who would lack
the basic skills to attend and complete college were four times more likely to be a minority. Id. at 465–
66. Cancian also found:
[I]f income is the criterion on which poverty determinations will be made, a school
can define poverty inclusively (as having been poor for at least one year between the
ages of 15 and 17) or exclusively (as having been always poor between the ages of
15 and 17). The inclusive definition will generate an eligible cohort that includes
candidates whose lives have been far less marred by poverty than will the exclusive
definition. In Cancian’s simulations, the exclusive definition of poverty produces an
eligible cohort that is 52 percent minority; the minority cohort under the inclusive
definition is 29 percent. The top of the bottom, in Cancian’s simulations, is
markedly whiter than the bottom of the bottom.
Id. at 466.
243
Specific evidence can also be seen in the University of Texas system after Hopwood. For
more on that effect, see supra note 88.
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public contracting.” This proposition went into effect in 1997, and by
comparing the enrollment patterns of students from the year before the
proposition with the patterns from the year after it went into effect, it is
clear that the new law had an immediate impact on diversity in California’s
institutions of higher education. At the undergraduate level for the entire
University of California system, “920 African-Americans enrolled as
college freshmen in 1997” and “that number fell to 739 in 1998,” and to
728 in 2000.246 At the most selective of California’s public universities,
Berkeley, freshman African American enrollment fell from 252 in 1997 to
122 in 1998.247 The year that the proposition went into effect, the
University of California at Berkeley School of Law only enrolled one
African American student out of a total of 270 students and he was
accepted a year earlier but had deferred his enrollment.248 In the fall of
2006, things had not improved much as only thirteen African American
students enrolled at the law school.249
Another popular argument against race-based affirmative action
focuses on the use of ten percent plans as a viable substitute for policies
that rely heavily on a student’s race. As mentioned earlier, the state of
Texas was able to mitigate the effects of the Hopwood decision by
implementing a ten percent plan which granted high school seniors
graduating in the top ten percent of their class automatic admission to their
choice of state university and the University of Texas.250 This plan had
some initial success in increasing minority enrollment after a sharp drop
off due to the Hopwood ruling.251 But, like income-based affirmative
action, this program also proved to be an insufficient alternative to racebased affirmative action. In a study released in 2003, Princeton University
sociologist Marta Tienda found that graduates in the top ten percent of
their class in Texas high schools were admitted with “near certainty” to
Texas public universities before Hopwood and before the ten percent plan
was created.252 Therefore, the state’s new ten percent plan did not assist
students in the second and third deciles of their high school classes and the
elimination of race-based affirmative action proved to be a huge detriment
244
Jennifer M. Chacón, Race as a Diagnostic Tool: Latinas/os and Higher Education in
California, Post-209, 96 C AL. L. R EV. 1215, 1216 (2008) (citing C AL. C ONST . art. I, § 31(a)).
245
Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 C AL. L. R EV. 1139,
1139 n.1 (2008).
246
Greenberg, supra note 193, at 543.
247
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248
Id. at 544 (citation omitted).
249
Michelle Locke, Blacks, Hispanics Rebound from Death of Preferences; Enrollment Back UpWith a Catch, C HI. SUN T IMES, May 7, 2007, at 36.
250
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
251
Id.
252
Press Release, Princeton University, Study: Texas ‘10 Percent Plan’ Fails to Sustain Diversity
at Flagship Universities (Jan. 23, 2003), available at http://www.princeton.edu/pr/news/03/q1/0123tienda.htm.
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to these students seeking admission to the state’s flagship universities.253
Tienda found that after Hopwood, the admission probability of students
ranked in the second decile of their senior class fell from 85.3% to 71.7%
for African Americans and from 86.9% to 75.9% for Hispanics at Texas
A&M.254 At the University of Texas at Austin, there was a drop in
admission probability from 78.7% to 73.8% for African Americans and
from 81.8% to 79.5% for Hispanics.255 During this same period, the
admission probability of similarly ranked white students rose from 80.2%
to 83.9% at Texas A&M.256 At the University of Texas at Austin, the
admission probability of white students ranked in the 80th to 89th
percentile of their class increased from 80.4% to 91.1% post-Hopwood.257
The University of Texas at Austin saw these declines in minority
enrollment despite combining the ten percent plan with an aggressive
outreach plan, named the UT Longhorn Scholars program, “which
recruited students from high schools with relatively large economically
disadvantaged and minority student bodies.”258
In a study looking at the percentage plan in Texas along with plans in
California and Florida, research found that the plans in those states had
“the least impact on the most competitive campuses, which [had] persisting
losses in spite of many levels of efforts to make up for affirmative
action.”259 The study also found that the plans only “serve as a kind of
shorthand for what university officials know are actually systems of openly
or loosely veiled race-attentive outreach, recruitment, support programs,
and financial aid that enhance the likelihood of application, admission, and
enrollment for some students,”260 and without such supports, “the plans are
more like empty shells, appearing to promise eligibility, admission, and
enrollment for previously excluded groups but actually doing very
little.”261
As the 2004 DOE report referenced in Part IV indicates, there are
many alternatives to race-based affirmative action programs.262 While this
is not the proper forum to discuss the success rates of each of those
alternatives, it is clear that two of the more popular alternatives, incomebased affirmative action and percentage plans, which have been utilized by
states with very successful public university systems, Texas, California,
253
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and Florida, are not adequate replacements for race-based affirmative
action programs. Therefore, at this point in time, race-based affirmative
action programs are needed to ensure diverse student bodies in higher
education.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that the holding of Parents Involved will have a
subtle, yet possibly significant effect on how college and university
admissions departments use and develop race-based affirmative action
policies. Although Grutter is still good law, the additional requirements
suggested by the Parents Involved Court are not in conflict with the 2003
affirmative action cases. Therefore, while the Supreme Court has not
adopted these requirements into the higher education setting, it is likely
that, should a case come before the Court in the future, it will look to both
Grutter and Parents Involved for guidance. In order to preempt a
challenge to its affirmative action policies, admissions departments should
structure their admissions criteria to the guidelines set by the Court in
Grutter and Parents Involved.
The college admissions process should determine “which set of
applicants, considered individually and collectively, will take fullest
advantage of what the college has to offer, contribute most to the
educational process in college, and be most successful in using what they
have learned for the benefit of the larger society.”263 This goal of the
admissions process is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s view of
diversity as a compelling governmental interest in higher education and the
educational and developmental benefits of learning in a diverse
environment. As a result, even if colleges and universities were to follow
the requirements subtly mandated by Parents Involved, the current law on
the use of affirmative action still allows for the admission of students who
will “contribute most to the educational process in college . . . .”264 Since
this optimal level has been achieved, the courts should refrain from
implementing any further restrictions or requirements on the use of
affirmative action by colleges and universities.
Perhaps Justice O’Connor was correct in her assertion that the need to
consider an applicant’s race in the admissions process can be eliminated
within the next couple of decades. However, it is clear that such a society
does not currently exist.265 Until it is evident that students of all
263
WILLIAM G. B OWEN & DEREK B OK , THE SHAPE OF THE R IVER: LONG -T ERM
C ONSEQUENCES OF C ONSIDERING R ACE IN C OLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 277 (1998).
264
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265
Jose J. Soto, legislative chairman of the American Association for Affirmative Action, listed
ten indicators that will lead him to argue for the end of affirmative action, equity, and diversity efforts
in higher education. The indicators are as follows:
1) When women and minorities have attained their proportionate share of
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backgrounds are on an “equal playing field,” in the best interests of justice
and public policy, Justice O’Connor’s deadline must be ignored and the
law toward affirmative action must maintain its current shape.

leadership and decision-making roles in our institutions of higher education,
business and industry, and government.
2) When the voices and views of minorities and women are actively solicited,
present, heard and accorded due respect and weight in the processes of hiring,
promotion, merit and retention in higher education, business and industry, and
government.
3) When policies, practices, attitudes and structures within our institutions,
organizations and workplaces support the development and success of qualified
minorities and women to the same extent that others are developed and supported.
4) When the cultural, social and interactional environments of our social
institutions and places of work, play and education are welcoming, supportive and
affirming of diverse “ways of thinking, being and doing.”
5) When the inclusion, representation and participation of minorities and women
are not afterthoughts or add-ons, but up-front and expected considerations as
processes, activities and events are planned, designed and developed.
6) When diversity “enriches” more than it “enrages.”
7) When diversity unites more than it divides.
8) When diversity is perceived and treated as an asset instead of a deficit.
9) When race and gender, as well as other statuses and characteristics, don’t
matter.
10) When minorities and women no longer have to work twice as hard to be
perceived as being “half-as-good.”
Jose J. Soto, United States is Not Ready for End of Affirmative Action, LINCOLN J. STAR, Apr. 21,
2008, at B4.

